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ABSTRACT
We study the daily behavior of supermarket prices and product availability following two recent natural
disasters: the 2010 earthquake in Chile and the 2011 earthquake in Japan. In both cases there was an
immediate and persistent effect on product availability. The number of goods available for sale fell
32% in Chile and 17% in Japan from the day of the disaster to its lowest point, which occurred 61
and 18 days after the  earthquakes, respectively. Product availability recovered slowly, and a significant
share of goods remained out of stock after six months. By contrast, prices were relatively stable and
did not increase for months after the earthquakes, even for goods that were experiencing severe stockouts.
These trends are present at all levels of aggregation, but appear strongly in non-perishable goods and
emergency products. Our findings shed light into the determinants of sticky prices in conditions where
traditional adjustment costs are less important. In particular, we look at the frequency and magnitudes
of price changes in both countries and find that the results in Chile are consistent with pricing models
where retailers have fear of "customer anger". In Japan, by contrast, the evidence suggests a bigger
role for supply disruptions that restricted the ability of retailers to re-stock goods after the earthquake.
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1 Introduction
The economic consequences of natural disasters are always measured with significant
delays. The data that are immediately available, such as the strength of the seismic waves or
the number of deaths, are not really useful to determine the economic impact of the disaster.
Aggregate statistics such as industrial production and GDP take months to be compiled and
published, forcing governments (and Central Banks in particular) to make decisions without
really knowing the magnitude of any shortages and price increases that may be affecting
the economy. Furthermore, even when the data becomes available, its low frequency tends
to hide the short-run effects taking place in the days immediately after the disaster. This
has limited the literature’s understanding of how prices and quantities react to this type of
exogenous, unanticipated shocks, which is a basic and fundamental issue in economics.
In this paper we propose using online data to measure two key economic variables in
the aftermath of a natural disaster: supply disruptions and pricing behaviors. We use data
from the Billion Prices Project (BPP) at MIT, a large and continuing effort to collect online
information from large retailers around the world on a daily basis. We construct daily price
indices across various goods and categories and measure the degree of supply disruption with
an index of product availability, which tracks the number of goods that are available for
purchase over time.
We focus on the earthquakes in Chile (2010) and Japan (2011), two major catastrophic
natural disasters that occurred in countries where the BPP was collecting data before the
events. We also limit our analysis to products sold in supermarkets, such as food, beverages,
and other basic necessities which are more likely to experience demand changes after a natural
disaster and for which we have more comprehensive data coverage.
We show that these natural disasters had an immediate impact on product availability.
A large share of goods went out of stock within days. The fall was gradual but larger in
Chile, where the number of products available fell by 32% in the first two months after the
earthquake, recovering slowly after that. In Japan, the fall was faster but smaller, with
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product availability dropping by 17% within 18 days after the earthquake, and recovering
gradually after that.
Prices, by contrast, remained surprisingly stable for several months after the earthquakes.
The inflation rate started to rise only after 4 months in Japan, and 6 months in Chile.
Nearly all categories of goods experienced a drop in product availability in both countries
during the first months. The recovery and price-change behaviors differed significantly across
categories. Many goods that could be considered indispensable after an earthquake, such as
powdered milk, diapers, and baby food, disappeared quickly from the stores and maintained
stable prices for a long time. Others, such as batteries, had drops in availability but they
recovered quicker with rising prices.
Natural disasters, with their unanticipated and exogenous nature, can be used to test some
of the predictions of the large New Keynesian literature on price stickiness. We therefore
focus on variables such as the frequency of price changes, their average size, and the shape
of the hazard functions for both stockout events and price adjustments.
In Chile, the data is consistent with the predictions of a growing strand of the literature
that has emphasized how fear of “consumer anger” may affect firms’ pricing decisions.1 In
particular, the frequency of price changes falls dramatically for several months after the
earthquake, suggesting that firms were delaying their price adjustments.
By contrast, in Japan the evidence is more consistent with a supply shock that affected
the retailer’s ability to re-stock. Product availability also fell dramatically, but the number of
price changes remained stable over time. In addition, the product availability index in Japan
has a surprisingly close co-movement with the official estimates of industrial production,
providing more evidence of the importance of the supply disruption in this case.
This paper is part of a large empirical literature on price stickiness, with papers such as
Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Lach and Tsiddon (1996), Kashyap
(1995), Levy et al. (1997), and Blinder et al. (1998). Our distinctive contribution is to analyze
1See for example (Blinder et al. (1998), Fabiani et al. (2006), and Rotemberg (2005).
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how prices and product availability behave at the time of natural disasters, which are unam-
biguous examples of exogenous and unanticipated aggregate shocks. Most of our findings are
consistent with theories that emphasize the effects of fairness concerns on pricing decisions,
such as in the work of Kahneman et al. (1986), Rotemberg (2005), and Rotemberg (2011).
Our results in Japan are complementary to the analysis in Weinstein and Schell (2012), who
argue that the supply disruption from the 2011 earthquake caused a much larger and per-
sistent contraction on industrial production than previous earthquakes. Finally, in a recent
paper, Gagnon and Lopez-Salido (2014) study the pricing response of U.S. supermarkets to
large demand shocks such as hurricane Katrina, and consistent with our results, find almost
no evidence that retailers responded to these shocks by raising prices.
2 The Earthquakes in Chile and Japan
On February 27, 2010, a strong earthquake (8.8 on the moment magnitude scale) struck
off the coast of central Chile. The earthquake was felt strongly in six Chilean regions (from
Valparaiso in the north to Araucania in the south) that include approximately 80% of the
country’s population. The earthquake also triggered a tsunami which caused widespread
destruction in coastal towns of south-central Chile, prompting President Michelle Bachelet
to immediately declare a “state of catastrophe” and to deploy emergency workers to the
affected areas.
Chile’s earthquake ranks as one of the most destructive in recent years in terms of eco-
nomic damage, as Table 1 shows. The total economic damage caused by the earthquake
was estimated at $30 billion, or 19% of GDP, according to the CRED International Disaster
Database (EM-DAT).
On March 11, 2011, an even stronger earthquake (9.0 on the moment magnitude scale)
struck off the Pacific coast of Japan, triggering a powerful tsunami with severe human and
economic consequences. Initial disruptions in Japan were larger than in Chile, particularly
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Table 1: Top Natural Disasters by Total Damages (2008-2012)
Country Date Type Killed Damages Damages
(US$ millions) (% of GDP)
Japan 11-Mar-11 Earthquake (9.0 Mw) 19,846 210,000.00 3.85
China 12-May-08 Earthquake (8.0 Mw) 87,476 91,285.30 2.43
Thailand 5-Aug-11 Flood 813 40,000.00 12.56
United States 12-Sep-08 Storm 82 32,218.34 0.21
Chile 27-Feb-10 Earthquake (8.8 Mw) 562 30,900.90 18.65
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EM-DAT and WDI databases.
because the tsunami caused a nuclear accident in a power-generating plant (the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex), forcing the evacuation of thousands of residents in
the vicinity of the plant. According to press reports, approximately 4.4 million households
in northeastern Japan were left without electricity and 1.5 million without water for days.
Nearly 20,000 people were killed as a result of the disaster.
Japan’s total economic costs were estimated to be US$ 210 billion, making this event the
costliest natural disaster in recent years in nominal terms. However, this represented only
4% of GDP, about 20 percent of the estimated cost in Chile.2
In both countries, concerns about possible food scarcity and price increases even in areas
that were not directly impacted by the earthquakes quickly surfaced on the news. In Chile, the
national Baker’s Association complained about unjustified increases to the price of flour.3 On
February 28, President Bachelet announced that the government had reached an agreement
with the major supermarkets which would require them to give away basic foodstuffs to people
affected by the earthquake.4 In newspaper interviews, government officials also threatened
2The significant differences in terms of estimated economic costs and mortality, despite the similar physical
intensity of the two events, warrants further discussion. As discussed in Cavallo et al. (2010), there are various
determinants of the economic costs of natural disasters in addition to the physical intensity of the events. One
of those determinants is the amount of capital exposed. Earthquakes are by their nature unpredictable and
the exact location where they may strike is usually unknowable. Therefore, while it is possible to implement
building codes and standards that better prepare infrastructure to resist possible earthquakes, it is not easy
to locate wealth and populations in “safer” areas. The damages and mortality associated to earthquakes
varies significantly, even for similar events.
3See http://bit.ly/12zcQDg
4See http://bit.ly/18dqv8L
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to enforce a law enacted in the 1970’s to penalize anyone who in the aftermath of a natural
disaster sells basic staples at excessive prices.5. Similarly, in Japan, within days after the
earthquake the press reported shortages of food and gasoline as people hoarded basic items
out of fear that supplies would soon dry up.6 According to some reports, shoppers in the
Tokyo metro area (150 miles from most affected areas) had cleaned supermarket shelves of
items such as rice, bread, and yogurt. Moreover, many retailers claimed to have run out of
emergency items such as blankets, sanitary pads, diapers, toilet paper, instant noodles, and
flashlights.7
Although reports and rumors in the media were widespread, there was no reliable in-
formation on the magnitudes of the shortages and price increases in the aftermath of these
events. Even though shortages and out-of-stock items can impose a significant welfare cost to
consumers, they are not traditionally measured by any official statistics. Official price indices
are available, but only with a significant delay, and their monthly frequency can obscure high
frequency patterns that could alter expectations and economic behavior in the days after a
natural disaster. In the next section, we discuss how online data can be used to construct
statistics that provide information on shortages and prices in real-time.
3 Data: The Billion Prices Project
Our data were collected as part of the Billion Prices Project (BPP), an academic initiative
at MIT that has been “scraping” daily prices from the largest online retailers around the
world since 2008. In this paper we use prices from the largest supermarket in Chile and one
of the leading supermarkets in Japan. Database details are shown in Table 2. We focus on a
9-month window around the day of the natural disaster: 3 months before and 6 months after
the event.
The data collection method is based on the use of software that monitors the public
5See http://bit.ly/17bXVTPI
6See http://bit.ly/14Qatjw
7See http://bit.ly/1bascHs
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Table 2: Data Description
Chile Japan
Initial Date December 2009 December 2010
End Date August 2010 September 2011
Products 17,141 3,982
Categories 265 26
Days with no data* 42 6
Notes: * These are days where the scraping software failed.
web pages where retailers list product and price information, scans the underlying code to
identify the relevant information (such as prices and availability), then stores everything in
a structured database.8
An example of a good in our data is “Whole Milk, Brand Name, 1 liter”. The scraping
software automatically collects data on every single product on display on the retailer’s
website each day. Goods are listed on the website only if they are in stock and available
for sale. Out of stock items therefore immediately disappear from our database, and only
reappear on the day that they are offered for sale again (if ever). We can therefore build
statistics to study how the set of goods available for purchase changes over time after a
natural disaster.9
In terms of data treatment, our prices include taxes and sale discounts, to account for the
final amount paid by the consumer. We do not include shipping costs, which vary according to
the location of the purchaser and are an exclusive feature of the online purchasing experience.
In addition, missing prices in the data were often caused by scraping errors on days when the
software fails to automatically start. For those dates, no data was collected. The number of
days with failures is reported in Table 2. These gaps in the data tend to last just one or two
days, until the scrape job is corrected. Finally, missing prices also occur when a good goes
temporarily out of stock. For the price index calculations, if a good disappears and later
8See Cavallo (2012) for more technical details on the scraping methodology.
9Our results on product availability are only a upper bound on the degree of supply-chain disruptions
because we only know if a good is completely out of stock, but not how many units are available over time if
it is still offered for sale. Supply disruptions affecting the normal level of inventories are not captured in our
metrics.
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reappears in our sample, we fill missing prices with the previously available values until a
new price is observed.
Although online transactions are still a small share of retail sales in most countries, we
are confident that the data collected online also provides information about oﬄine prices
and product availability. In the case of Chile, Cavallo (2012) presents the results of an
online-oﬄine validation with a randomly chosen sample of 100 goods for the same Chilean
retailer used in this paper. Prices were sampled at an oﬄine store in 15-day intervals between
December 2008 and January 2009, then compared to the online prices for the same goods on
the same day. Only one retailer was involved in this validation exercise, but it is the same
retailer whose data are included in this paper. Over 90% of goods in the oﬄine store where
also available online on the same date. Furthermore, for those available in both locations,
prices were identical in 89% of the cases.10 Unfortunately we do not have direct evidence of
the difference between online and oﬄine prices in the case of Japan, but we note that Cavallo
(2012) found that online retailers tend to have stable markups in percentage terms in many
countries, implying similar online and oﬄine inflation rates. We can test this prediction in
the case of Japan, by comparing a supermarket price index with the official data price trends,
as we do in the Section 4.
4 The Aggregate Impact: Prices and Product Avail-
ability
Natural disasters can create both supply and demand shocks that affect prices and prod-
uct availability. Supply shocks originate in the destruction of production capacity and the
disruption of supply chains. Demand shocks are linked to the panic that consumers may ex-
perience after natural disasters, with people rushing to the stores to purchase basic necessities
and hoard goods that they fear could become unavailable in the days to come.
10Only 11 goods had different prices. They were all raw-food items that were sold online in packages with
pre-defined sizes, yet sold by weight in the oﬄine stores, creating unit-price differences across the samples.
8
99
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
Pr
ic
e 
In
de
x
12−09 02−10 04−10 06−10 08−10
Date
Price Index
(a) Chile
99
.8
10
0
10
0.
2
10
0.
4
10
0.
6
10
0.
8
Pr
ic
e 
In
de
x
01−11 04−11 07−11 10−11
Date
Price Index
(b) Japan
Notes:
Unweighed geometric-average price index. All the products available for sale each day are used.
Figure 1: Price Index (Online Data)
In this section, we look at aggregate prices and product availability in both Chile and
Japan, and compare it to the predictions of recent pricing models.
4.1 Prices
Figure 1 shows a price index constructed with the online data. The index is normalized
to a value of 100 on the day of the natural disaster in order to more easily track changes
after the event, as well as better compare across countries. The vertical line marks the day
of the natural disaster. The index is a simple Jevons geometric-average price index that uses
all the products sold by these supermarkets and implicitly assigns equal importance to all
goods. Details of the methodology and motivation for this index formula are provided in the
Appendix.
In both cases prices did not increase significantly during the first few months after the
events. In Chile, the trend of the index remained remarkably stable after the earthquake.
Prices only rose in mid-July 2010, almost 6 months after the earthquake.11 In Japan, a
similar pattern emerges. Before the earthquake, prices had a negative trend, which did not
11Note that there is a relatively big spike in the Chilean index in late July. The scraping software failed
for 10 days before this date, so this spike reflects accumulated price changes during this period. A similar
thing happened at the end of August, with a large drop in the index.
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Figure 2: Price Index (Online Data) vs. the CPI
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Notes: For
our daily measure of “monthly inflation” at time t, we are taking the average in the index from t to t− 29
and calculating the percentage change with respect to the same average a month before, from t− 30 to
t− 59.
change during the first 4 months after the earthquake. Only in mid-August did the inflation
trend change and prices start to rise.12
The pricing trends in the supermarket data is consistent with those later reflected in
official CPI data. This can be seen in Figure 2, where we plot a daily measure of “monthly
inflation” using online data and compare it to the monthly official CPI (all items, non-
seasonally adjusted).
There is co-movement and even some anticipation in the online supermarket data, partic-
ularly in the case of Chile. Overall, CPI estimates were stable in both countries for several
months, just as in our data. The only exception was a temporary spike in Japan’s CPI in
April 2011 which was driven by a 0.2% increase in fuel and transportation, categories of
goods not covered in our sample.13
12Prices for this retailer in Japan do not adjust every day, but rather on a weekly basis. This explains the
stepped pattern of the index over time. In addition, many of these weekly steps are related to temporary
sales, which last for about a week. The day before the earthquake there was a drop in the index associated
with one of those sale events. Prices continued to fall the week of the earthquake, but recovered back to their
previous level the week after.
13Note that the monthly online inflation rate is calculated on a daily basis using the average of the index in
the previous thirty days compared to the same average a month before. A monthly rate calculated this way
(instead of using a simple 30-day difference) has the advantage of being less sensitive to the daily volatility
in the index. This method, however, introduces some smoothing into the results. In addition, Figure 2 does
not reflect the effects of the last days of the online price index movements (shown in Figure 1) because we
limited the sample to exactly 180 days after the earthquakes. Since the CPI is updated at the end of the
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Figure 3: Product Availability
4.2 Product Availability
The rigidity of prices contrasts sharply with the behavior of goods availability in the
aftermath of the earthquakes. Figure 3 shows indices of product availability for both countries.
We measure product availability with a simple index that captures how many items are
for sale in the supermarket on a given day. We normalize the index to a value of 100 on
the day of the natural disaster in order to be able to easily compute the change in product
availability over time, as well as to facilitate comparisons across categories and countries. All
goods sold by these retailers are included in each case, with every good having equal weight
in the index. As such, these metrics are meant to show retailer-level effects. In the next
section we compare results across categories.14
In the case of Chile, overall product availability fell by almost 8% the day after the
earthquake and decreased an additional 25% to its lowest level, which occurred 61 days after
the earthquake. Product availability did not fully recover to pre-event levels during the
month, and we are plotting the graphs only for the days with data in both the CPI and the online index,
Figure 2 does not show the information for the partial results on the last month of the sample.
14We do not have product expenditure weights and are therefore not able to construct weighted indices.
The potential impact of weights is not obvious for the case of product availability. For example, it is possible
that the goods that disappear from the stores are those that are sold the most, making the product availability
concerns even stronger than what our results imply. But it is also possible that, given the emergency, retailers
shift their focus to the most widely sold products, making an effort to keep them in stock. In that case, a
drop in product availability would be less worrisome (people have less variety, but the goods they buy the
most are still available).
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sample window. Six months after the earthquake, the number of goods sold was still 15%
lower than before the earthquake.15
In Japan, product availability fell much faster and, initially, by a larger margin. It dropped
approximately 17% from peak to trough (18 days after the earthquake). Japan’s product
availability started to recover quickly, although it also remained below the pre-earthquake
level during our sample window. After 6 months, the number of goods sold was still 5% lower
than before the earthquake.
The Japanese index has two additional characteristics worth noting. First, there is a
weekly pattern of ups and downs, which appears to be driven by re-stocking occurring on a
weekly basis. This coincides with days in which most price changes take place, as we show
later on. Second, there was a significant drop on December 22 (the day before the “Emperor’s
Birthday” holiday) that lasted until January 2 (the day after the “New Year’s” holiday). We
take this as evidence of how spikes in demand can affect availability.16
5 Category-Level Impacts
We now focus on category-level metrics. We first show that the trends identified in
the previous section are present in most categories of goods. There are, however, significant
category-level differences. In particular, the combination of large drops in product availability
and stable prices is strongest for non-perishable goods. By contrast, perishable items had
quicker price increases and less persistent shortages.
An important advantage of online data is that products are automatically categorized
by the retailers, which tend to display similar products next to each other. The names
that identify the product categories are typically displayed on top of each page, in an area
called the “breadcrumb.” For example, the page where every “whole milk” product is shown
15The availability index immediately incorporates new goods, even if they were not sold before the earth-
quake. Therefore, if the pre-earthquake goods were being replaced with new varieties, these would be already
included in the index
16There are also two single-day drops in September 2011 which were caused by scraping errors.
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Figure 4: Chile: Changes in Availability and Prices
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Figure 5: Japan: Changes in Availability and Prices
would typically have the following breadcrumb: “Home >> Groceries >> Diary >> Milk
>> Whole Milk.” In all cases we scraped the data at the most disaggregated level available,
resulting in 26 different categories in Japan, and 256 in Chile.
For a comprehensive view across all categories, we first compute a product availability
and price level index at each category level. We then calculate the percentage change in the
first 30 and 180 days after the earthquake, and plot results for all categories in Figures 4 and
5. 17
The y-axis shows the accumulated drop in product availability. In both countries we
find that most categories experienced significant availability drops in the first 30 days of the
17Time series of availability and prices for a selected number of categories are shown in the Appendix.
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disaster and were closer to their pre-disaster levels after 180 days. The aggregate results
on availability are therefore not driven by just a few categories. Instead, both of these
earthquakes had an impact on the availability of nearly all categories of goods sold at the
stores.
The x-axis, where the accumulated price changes in each category are plotted, shows a
different pattern. There are roughly the same number of categories with price increases and
decreases, both at the 30 and 180-day horizons. While the aggregate price index is stable,
there is clearly significant dispersion in pricing behaviors across categories.
We can shed some light on the differences in price and availability responses by looking at
individual categories over time. In Figures 6 to 9 we plot daily indices for distinct groups of
goods that show different behaviors along these two dimensions. We start with Chile, where
the category information is available at a more disaggregated level.
First, there is a distinct set of goods whose product availability decreased by more than
20%. In some cases product availability fell within days of the earthquake. Examples include:
pasta (6(a)), powdered milk (6(b)), and basic staples like baby diapers (6(c)). In other cases,
the drop was more gradual, as with baby foods (6(d)), soups (6(e)), and unflavored cookies
(6(f)). Note that these are all nonperishable goods that people are likely to stock up on if
they are fearful of future scarcity, which can explain why they disappeared from the stores.
Interestingly, in all these cases prices remained stable for several months.
A second group of goods, as shown in Figure 7, had significant drops in product availability
but started having price increases soon after the earthquake. These included perishable goods
like eggs (7(a)), fresh vegetables (7(b)), and meat (7(c)).
A third set of goods had no fall in product availability coupled with higher prices. These
include fish (8(a)) and batteries (8(b)), which may be surprising given that coastal towns were
affected by the tsunami following the earthquake and also that demand for batteries likely
increased in the aftermath of the event for fear of blackouts. It is possible, however, that the
large price increases helped reduce demand and prevent stockout. Finally, the case of Milk
14
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Figure 6: Chile - Drops in Product Availability and Stable Prices
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Figure 7: Chile - Drops in Product Availability and Higher Prices
(8(c)) is interesting because the Chilean government explicitly announced policies intended
to secure its availability at stable prices to victims of the earthquake.18 These policies appear
to have worked successfully, at least during the first four months after the earthquake.
In Japan the product categories are much more broadly defined, due to the way the
retailer chooses to group products on its website. Still, some interesting patterns emerge as
shown in Figure 9. First, we find fresh fish (9(a)) among the categories where stocks fell
sharply after the earthquake. This is not surprising because many fishing ports in Japan
were washed out by the tsunami, and health concerns arose due to the nuclear accident in
Fukushima. Similarly, the stock of meat (9(b)) fell after the earthquake. Notwithstanding
the fall in product availability, in both cases prices did not change much after the earthquake.
Another category where product availability fell was baby food (9(c)) . However, in this case,
the price increased sharply (for Japanese standards) about a month after the earthquake, as
product availability began to recover. Other categories, such as tea (9(d)) , suffered only
18See http://bit.ly/13HyNY4
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Figure 8: Chile - Stable Product Availability
mild decreases in availability, while prices increased steadily after the shock.
Understanding the specific trends in each category of goods is beyond the scope of this
paper, as many of the trends observed in these graphs may not be related at all with the
earthquake but rather to individual shocks and seasonal patterns in each group. There are,
however, two main trends that stand out from the previous analysis. First, the fall in product
availability observed in the aggregate data affected the vast majority of categories, while
prices remained stable on average. Second, there is significant heterogeneity across categories,
particularly in terms of pricing behaviors and their interaction with product availability after
the earthquake. In the next section, we explore potential explanations for these trends.
6 Supply Shocks and Consumer Anger
It is not surprising to see items that go out of stock in the days after an earthquake:
people get scared, demand for some basic goods rises suddenly, and retailers have no time to
17
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Figure 9: Japan: Categories
react either with prices or stocks. What is harder to understand is how the combination of
large stockout and stable prices can persist for many months.
One possibility is that retailers are unable to re-stock (and re-price) due to a persistent
supply disruption. In particular, suppose that a retailer sets a simple markup over marginal
cost, and that this marginal cost becomes known only at the time when goods are purchased
from the wholesaler. If the supply chain is broken because of the earthquake, either because
goods are not being produced or they cannot be transported, then the retailer will simply not
be updating those prices at all. That is, this would be a setup where prices only change when
new inventory is added. The combination of a cost-based pricing strategy and a persistent
supply shock could therefore explain why so many goods remain out of stock and prices do
not change for so long.19
Another possibility is that retailers are able to re-stock at a higher cost, but they are
unable to increase their own price due to fear of “customer anger”. If they can not charge
19A necessary condition is also that the prices of available goods should not be significantly affected by
the lack of availability in related goods that disappear.
18
higher prices, they have less incentive to replace goods that have disappeared from the
stores.20.
In macroeconomics, the importance of customer relationships and the effect on price
changes goes back to the work of Okun (1981). Okun emphasized how firms with repeated
customer interactions may refrain from raising prices when facing increases in demand. The
fear of antagonizing customers is also frequently mentioned by retailers in surveys as a reason
for not changing prices often (Blinder et al. (1998), Fabiani et al. (2006)). More recent papers
such as Renner and Tyran (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) have focused on the
existence of “customer markets” and their implications for price-setting decisions.
In the context of an earthquake, perhaps the most relevant theoretical literature is the
one that touches on aspects of “fairness” in pricing. The seminal paper by Kahneman et
al. (1986) spurred a large literature that explores how considerations of fairness can affects
perceptions of price changes. More recent theoretical papers such as Rotemberg (2005)
and Rotemberg (2011) provide models where consumers experience disappointment with
price changes that they consider “unfair”, ultimately affecting the price-setting decisions of
firms. In Rotemberg (2005) fairness considerations enter directly into the utility function.
Consumers expect producers to have a certain degree of altruism and form expectations about
the size of price change that is acceptable. The level of altruism can change exogenously.
For example, during a natural disaster consumers could simply expect retailers to reduce
their margins and be more altruistic. This threshold of fairness can also change with the
amount and quality of information available to consumers. For example, if consumers think
that the retailer’s costs have increased, then they may tolerate higher price changes. This
could, for example, explain why the prices of perishable goods increased in Chile. After all,
consumers can easily understand that an earthquake will affect the supply of goods such
as eggs and meat, but they may not understand why the cost of easy-to-stock items such
20It is possible, however, that there are indirect incentives to re-stock even when price changes are not
possible. For example, retailers may derive reputational advantages to being seen as a reliable suplier. This
would be consistent with “sensitive” good categories that experienced both stable availability and prices after
the earthquake, such as Milk in Chile.
19
as pasta, powdered milk, or baby food may be affected. In Rotemberg (2011), fairness is
linked to regrets that customers have from not buying the good before a price increase. In
the context of an earthquake, for example, consumers may regret not having bought the
products needed for an emergency kit. Similarly, perishable goods would be less affected by
regret considerations. 21
Regardless of the specific mechanism taking place, natural disasters will tend to both cause
significant supply disruptions and increase concerns about fairness. So the two explanations
for the aggregate results described above are plausible and not mutually exclusive.22 However,
we can learn more about their relative importance in each country by looking closely at some
price-stickiness statistics.
The effects of the earthquakes are noticeably different when we consider the number,
frequency, and size of price changes in each country. Starting with Figure 10, we can see that
in Chile the number of daily changes fell immediately after the earthquake, consistent with
the fear of “consumer anger”. In Japan, by contrast, there is little change in the number
of price changes over time. About 100 prices changed each week, both before and after the
earthquake. The earthquake did not change the number of prices that changed per week,
even though it had a large impact on the number of products available for sale.
An interesting feature in both countries is that price changes appear to occur periodically,
both for price increases and price decreases. This pattern is particularly strong in the case of
Japan, where prices are changed only once a week. This is consistent with time-dependent
pricing decisions, and they are likely connected to the times when stocks are replenished in the
stores. Indeed, the index of product availability for Japan in Figure 3 has a similar pattern of
weekly spikes, suggesting that the timing of re-stockings and price changes is closely related.
A large number of papers have found evidence of synchronization and time-dependent pricing,
21Even if retailers are not worried about customer reactions, they may be afraid of government sanctions.
For example, in the case of Chile, a few days after the earthquake the government publicly threatened to
apply a law from the 1970’s that penalizes people who sell goods at “excessive” prices. The wording of the
law is ambiguous; it states that it is unlawful to sell during times of emergency at higher than “official prices”.
22Okun (1981) emphasized how worries about customer relationships could explain why so many firms use
a cost-plus pricing strategy in the first place.
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Figure 11: Price Stickiness: Frequency of Price Changes
particularly in developed economies. Examples include Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Lach and
Tsiddon (1996), Dutta et al. (2002), Owen and Trzepacz (2002), and Midrigan (2011).
In Figure 11, we plot the “frequency of price changes” over time, defined as the number
of changes by the total number of prices that can change each day. This is essentially an
unconditional probability of daily price change, computed over a rolling window of 30-day
averages to smooth out the daily volatility. In Chile the frequency of changes fell from 0.018
to 0.01 after the disaster, with an implied duration of the average price spell (measured as
1/frequency) that goes from 55 to 100 days. The effect was both strong and persistent,
lasting over 3 months.
In Japan, by contrast, the frequency of price changes increased after the earthquake. This
21
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is just reflecting that the number of price changes remained stable while the availability of
product was falling. This behavior is in sharp contrast to the predictions of a simple model
of customer anger. Overall, the data in Japan appears to be more consistent with a supply
shock affecting the capacity of the retailers to replenish their stocks. The retailer continued
implementing the same number of price changes per week as before. The average size of price
changes remained stable for a couple of months, as shown in Figure12, but it rose suddenly
in June 2011, probably reflecting increases in wholesale prices that were being passed-on to
consumers after months of delays.23
The idea that Japan suffered a persistent supply shock is intuitive given the Fukushima
nuclear disaster that followed the earthquake. Indeed, in a recent paper Weinstein and Schell
(2012) argue that the 2011 earthquake in Japan caused a much larger and persistent con-
traction of industrial production than previous earthquakes, and show that this was directly
linked to the reduction in energy production. Could this have affected product availability?
The evidence in Figure 13, where we plot our index of product availability and the official
index of industrial production in both countries, suggests it did. In Japan, there is a sur-
prising co-movement between both indices. Industrial production fell by 15% in the month
23This is consistent with standard menu cost models, such as Mankiw (1985), where small price changes
are not optimal. In the presence of an adjustment cost, prices remain fixed until the accumulated difference
with the optimal price becomes large enough to cover it.
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Figure 13: Availability and Industrial Production
after the earthquake, and recovered at a very similar rate as our product availability index
over time. By contrast, industrial production in Chile, although negatively affected by the
earthquake, recovered quickly to its previous level within a couple of months.
7 Survival Analysis
In Section 4 we showed that the immediate effects of the natural disaster were mostly in
product availability, not in prices. Section 5 shows that this applies to most categories of
goods. We now extend the analysis to study good-level effects of price changes and stockout.
Our objective is to estimate the “Hazard Rate” of price changes (or stockout). This is the
probability of a price change (or stockout) conditional on the number of days since the natural
disaster. We want to understand if, at the good level, there is evidence that the hazard rate
of stockout decreases with time after the disaster, while the hazard rate of price changes
increases. We also want to see if goods that are considered necessities after an earthquake
(e.g. those in a typical emergency kit) tend to behave differently in terms of their good-level
hazards.
To measure hazard rates, we use standard methods in Survival Analysis, a technique that
focuses on the time elapsed from the “onset of risk” until the occurrence of a “failure” event.
In our context, the “risk” starts on the day of the natural disaster, and the “failure” is a
23
stockout (or a price change). Formally, if T is a random variable measuring the duration of
the price spell, with density function f(t) and cumulative density F (t), the hazard h(t) is
the limiting probability that a failure occurs at time t, conditional on the days passed since
the natural disaster:
h(t) = lim
∆t→0
Pr(t < T < t + ∆t|t < T )
∆t
(1)
The hazard measures the instantaneous risk of a stockout over time, conditional on sur-
vival until that day. To estimate it, we use a non-parametric approach from Nelson (1972)
and Aalen (1978), which does not require any distributional assumptions.24 It starts with a
simple estimate of the cumulative hazard function H(t), given by:
Ĥ(t) =
∑
j|tj6t
cj
nj
(2)
where cj is the number of failures at time tj and nj is the number of goods that can still
fail at time tj. The incremental steps cj/nj are an estimate for the probability of failure at
tj, taking into account only those goods that have survived until that point in time. Unlike
the product availability index in previous sections, the hazard rate for stockout will therefore
not consider goods that are new after the earthquake (goods that were not available for sale
before the earthquake, but that appear some time later on). This allows us to isolate the
effects of the earthquake on goods that existed at the time of the disaster.
To obtain the smoothed hazard function ĥ(t), we take the discrete changes in Ĥ(t) and
weight them using a kernel function:
ĥ(t) =
1
b
∑
j∈D
K
(
t− tj
b
)
∆Ĥ(tj) (3)
where K is a symmetric kernel density, b is the smoothing bandwidth, and D is the set
24Results are robust to the use of a semi-parametric Cox model that can incorporate covariates and account
for unobserved heterogeneity at the category level.
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Figure 14: Hazards in Chile
of times with failures.
We conduct the analysis separately for price changes and stockout. Only the first occur-
rence of each of the failure events is considered for each good. That is, a good that disappears
from the store at time t will not be used to compute the stockout hazard rate from then on,
even if it re-appears later on. This is a fair assumption because any subsequent stockout
will not likely be linked to the natural disaster itself. Similarly, if a good has a price change
after the natural disaster at time t, it will drop from our price-change hazard estimates from
then on. We are implicitly assuming that the retailers fully adjust to the earthquake at the
time when the first price change is implemented. An alternative assumption would be that
retailers adjust gradually, implementing a series of small price changes over time. We do not,
however, find any evidence of this behavior in this data.
Figures 14 and 15 plot the estimated hazard functions with 95% confidence intervals for
both countries. In all cases, we include a horizontal line at the unconditional probability over
the sample period.
These hazards show that the daily probability of going out of stock immediately after
the earthquake was close to 0.8% in both countries (approximately 20% in a month). This
is significantly higher than the unconditional daily probability 0.3% per day in Chile (9%
per month) and 0.4% in Japan (12% per month). This initial similarity between countries
25
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Figure 15: Hazards in Japan
disappears after the first week. In Chile the stockout hazard falls gradually. The longer
the amount of time since the disaster, the lower the probability a good has of disappearing
from the store. The effect is persistent, with the stockout hazard remaining above the
unconditional probability until around 90 days.
In Japan the stockout hazard falls much quicker and starts to increase again 50 days after
the disaster, as seen in Figure 15. Most of the stockout risk happens within a narrow window
of time. If a good does not disappear quickly from the store, then it is not very likely to
disappear at all. Once again, this result is consistent with disruptions in the supply chain.
Those goods that managed to remain in stock are likely the goods that did not have any
supply-chain problems to begin with, and therefore the retailer can keep then in stock over
time.
The price change hazards in both countries start at similarly low levels immediately
after the earthquake, around 0.01% (an implied duration of 100 days). This level represents
a significant drop in Chile compared to the unconditional daily probability of 0.018% (an
implied duration of 55 days), but only a small drop for Japan, where prices are usually stickier
and the unconditional probability is 0.014% (an implied duration of 75 days). From then on,
these hazard rates remains low for several months in both countries, reflecting the reluctance
of these retailers to make any price changes at all.
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Figure 16: Perishable and Emergency Goods In Chile
We can also compute hazards for different types of goods and see if there are any dif-
ferences for “Emergency” products and “Perishable” goods, as suggested by the results in
Section 5. We do this only for Chile, were we have more detailed category information to
classify goods into these two groups. Emergency products are those listed by the Chilean
government as part of a suggested emergency kit in case of natural disasters.25
Customer anger theories tend to have different predictions about the post-earthquake
behavior of these two types of goods. The probability of a price change should be lower for
emergency goods immediately after an earthquake (because people consider increases to be
unfair), while the probability of a stockout should be higher (they are in high demand and
their prices are not rising). Perishable items, by contrast, are the type of goods that are not
likely to experience such a big demand shock and consumers would be more likely to consider
price increases as fair (either because it is easier to understand that the cost to supply things
like fresh vegetables goes up after an earthquake, or because people may actually experience
less regret for not buying them before the earthquake). This is exactly what we find in
Figure 16 for the earthquake in Chile.
Finally, while these hazard rates provide evidence on the likelihood of both stockout
and hazards as time from the earthquake increases, they do not directly link goods that
25See http://www.onemi.cl/kit-de-emergencia.html
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had stockout with those that had price changes.26 To examine this, we compute (on a
monthly basis) the share of price increases, price decreases, or identical prices on the day of
re-introduction. Results are shown in Figure 17.27
In both countries the vast majority of goods that went out stock after the earthquake,
and later reappeared, did so at exactly the same price they had before (collapsing the time
series, we find that 67% of re-introductions had identical prices in Chile and 87% in Japan).
This suggest that either wholesale prices did not increase, or the retailers were not able or
willing to pass-through any higher costs to consumers immediately upon re-stocking.28
8 Conclusions
We study the aggregate behavior of prices and product availability in the aftermath of two
recent catastrophic natural disasters: the 2010 earthquake in Chile and the 2011 earthquake
in Japan. We show that in both cases, the margin of adjustment during the disaster was in
26For example, the price change hazard in Figures 14(b) and 15(b) include observations from good that
had both stockouts and those that did not. An interesting question is what happens to prices of goods that
go out of stock once they are re-introduced at the stores.
27We use only to goods that were available on the day of the earthquake, go out of stock later on, and
re-appear at some point during our sample period, To avoid the effects of potential scraping error, we required
goods to disappear from the database for at least 3 days before we consider them as having a stockout.
28The size of price changes in Japan did increase considerably in June 2011, as shown in Figure 12.
However, these were price changes from goods that were already in stock at the time.
28
product availability, not prices. We find that this is consistent with the expected response
in the context of “customer anger” models, such as Rotemberg (2005), particularly in Chile,
where the frequency of price changes fell significantly after the earthquake. In Japan, we
find evidence more closely linked to supply disruption and the retailer’s inability to re-stock
items than pricing behavior linked to consumer anger.
Our metrics capture the effects of both demand and supply conditions. The demand shock
is associated with the needs and fears that people experience in the immediate aftermath of
the disaster. Goods that disappear quickly from the stores are mostly nonperishable items
that people are likely to hoard in fear of future supply disruptions. The supply shock affects
the ability of retailers to replenish their stocks over time, even after the initial spike in
demand dissipates. In some cases, as we showed for Japan, product availability disruptions
could serve as early indicators of the magnitude of industrial production changes.
Online data have many advantages in the context of natural disasters. Data can be col-
lected remotely, in real time, and without requiring any resources from the retailers involved.
But there are also important limitations. Relatively few retailers and categories of goods
are currently available online, particularly in poor countries. Even when retailers are on-
line, their servers could stop operating during natural disasters, so there is no way to scrape
data. In other cases, retailers may simply stop updating prices and stock information online,
voluntarily suspending their online service during the time of the disaster. The reliability
of online data sources under extreme circumstances needs to be determined, and will likely
depend on the country and context under which the natural disaster occurs.
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-APPENDIX- NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Appendix
A.1 Index Methodologies
In order to study the short-run impacts of natural disasters on product availability and
prices, we apply an event study approach. We use daily price and product availability
information, focusing on a window of 9 months around the date of the natural disaster.
We base our analysis on 2 simple statistics:
• Product Availability Index: At different levels of aggregation, we count the number of
distinct products available for sale each day. We repeat this calculation for each day on
a 9-month window around the earthquake to see the impact of the earthquake on the
number of products available over time. We normalize the series to a value of 100 on
the day of the natural disaster in order to be able to compare results across categories
and countries.
• Price Index: We use a Jevons geometric-index formulation used by most national sta-
tistical agencies for basic-level indices (the narrowest level of aggregation). First, we
compute the daily price relative to all individual goods at each day of the sample. Each
“price relative” is equal to the price at t over the price at t − 1. Second, we calculate
an unweighted geometric average of all good-level price relatives on day t and category
z. Third, at time t = 0 we compute the index as the previous day’s index value times
the geometric average of price relatives for that day (calculated before). We start with
an index value of 100 on the first day of the sample.
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